How Politics Has Poisoned Islam
ISTANBUL — We Muslims like to believe that ours is “a religion of peace,” but today Islam looks more like a religion of conflict and bloodshed. From the civil wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen to internal tensions in Lebanon and Bahrain, to the dangerous rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Middle East is plagued by intra-Muslim strife that seems to go back to the ancient Sunni-Shiite rivalry.
Religion is not actually at the heart of these conflicts — invariably, politics is to blame. But the misuse of Islam and its history makes these political conflicts much worse as parties, governments and militias claim that they are fighting not over power or territory but on behalf of God. And when enemies are viewed as heretics rather than just opponents, peace becomes much harder to achieve.
This conflation of religion and politics poisons Islam itself, too, by overshadowing all the religion’s theological and moral teachings. The Quran’s emphasis on humility and compassion is sidelined by the arrogance and aggressiveness of conflicting groups.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/04/opini ... d=45305309
The Relationship Between Religion and Politics in Islam
How Muslim Governments Impose Ignorance
Excerpt:
None of this is news, of course. The scarcity of intellectual freedom under self-described Islamic states has received criticism from many corners, from Islamophobic conservatives to Muslim liberals. In response, the authorities who censor books or ban blogs usually shrug. They typically think that freedom of speech is a Western invention to which they don’t have to subscribe. In Malaysia, the government brazenly condemns “liberalism” and “human rights-ism.”
These censors like to think that by protecting believers from dangerous ideas they are doing a great favor to Muslim societies. They are doing the opposite. Their thought-policing only helps enfeeble and intellectually impoverish Muslims: When Muslim minds aren’t challenged by “dangerous” ideas they cannot develop the sophistication needed to articulate their own.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/opini ... 87722&_r=0
Excerpt:
None of this is news, of course. The scarcity of intellectual freedom under self-described Islamic states has received criticism from many corners, from Islamophobic conservatives to Muslim liberals. In response, the authorities who censor books or ban blogs usually shrug. They typically think that freedom of speech is a Western invention to which they don’t have to subscribe. In Malaysia, the government brazenly condemns “liberalism” and “human rights-ism.”
These censors like to think that by protecting believers from dangerous ideas they are doing a great favor to Muslim societies. They are doing the opposite. Their thought-policing only helps enfeeble and intellectually impoverish Muslims: When Muslim minds aren’t challenged by “dangerous” ideas they cannot develop the sophistication needed to articulate their own.
More...
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/17/opini ... 87722&_r=0
A model for the separation of politics from social and cultural activities of an Islamic party....
Tunisian Islamic Party Re-elects Moderate Leader
TUNIS — The leader of Tunisia’s main Islamic political party was re-elected on Monday, winning endorsement for his effort to move the party away from its Islamist roots and stay in tune with the country’s five-year-old democratic revolution.
The leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, a renowned Islamic thinker who spent 22 years in exile during Tunisia’s dictatorship, had tears in his eyes Monday as he embraced his rival in the party vote, which he won with 800 of the 1,058 ballots cast.
The vote, a culmination of a three-day party congress here in Tunis, was a victory for Mr. Ghannouchi, 74, and an important turning point for his party, Ennahda, as it seeks to separate the party’s religious and political activities.
“One of the most important changes we came to was the independence of the political mission and the political party from social and cultural activities,” Mr. Ghannouchi told reporters. “We were not able to achieve this cause before because of a lack of clarity.”
He said the party had matured and the country’s new Constitution — guaranteeing freedom of religion, and calling for a separation of politics from civil society — had made a change in the party’s direction possible.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world ... d=71987722
Tunisian Islamic Party Re-elects Moderate Leader
TUNIS — The leader of Tunisia’s main Islamic political party was re-elected on Monday, winning endorsement for his effort to move the party away from its Islamist roots and stay in tune with the country’s five-year-old democratic revolution.
The leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, a renowned Islamic thinker who spent 22 years in exile during Tunisia’s dictatorship, had tears in his eyes Monday as he embraced his rival in the party vote, which he won with 800 of the 1,058 ballots cast.
The vote, a culmination of a three-day party congress here in Tunis, was a victory for Mr. Ghannouchi, 74, and an important turning point for his party, Ennahda, as it seeks to separate the party’s religious and political activities.
“One of the most important changes we came to was the independence of the political mission and the political party from social and cultural activities,” Mr. Ghannouchi told reporters. “We were not able to achieve this cause before because of a lack of clarity.”
He said the party had matured and the country’s new Constitution — guaranteeing freedom of religion, and calling for a separation of politics from civil society — had made a change in the party’s direction possible.
More...
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/24/world ... d=71987722
‘Islamism Is Dead!’ Long Live Muslim Democrats
TUNIS — “Islamism is dead!” announced Said Ferjani, a leader of the progressive wing of Ennahda, Tunisia’s main Islamist party, as we drank coffee in a hotel cafe here last month. Mr. Ferjani, a former hard-liner who once plotted a coup against the regime of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, was upbeat as he described the historic transition his party was about to make.
His wing had combined with the party leadership to push through a raft of resolutions that would not only rebrand Ennahda but also break with the tradition of political Islam that began with the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in the late 1920s. According to Mr. Ferjani, Islamism had been useful under the Ben Ali dictatorship when “our identity and sense of purpose” was threatened by an authoritarian state. Now that Ennahda is engaged in open, legal party politics under a new Constitution, which it helped to write, and competes for national leadership, the Islamist label had become more a burden than a benefit.
The party’s co-founder and leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, was more circumspect when I interviewed him at his home. He shifted uneasily when I asked him whether he thought Islamism was dead.
“I wouldn’t put it that way,” he commented. But he did reject the label, saying, “We don’t see any reason to distinguish ourselves from other Muslims.” Both Mr. Ghannouchi and Mr. Ferjani prefer the term “Muslim Democrats” — which deliberately draws an analogy with the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe — to describe their new, post-Islamist identity.
In particular, Mr. Ferjani’s explicit commitment to the principles of freedom and equality makes him perhaps the foremost post-Islamist political figure in the Sunni Arab world. While he calls himself a conservative and extols “family values,” Mr. Ferjani says he regards sexuality, sexual orientation and gender identity — including the transgender issues preoccupying the United States — as private and personal, and not matters for the state or legal authorities to prescribe.
Mr. Ferjani also adheres to the neutrality of the state on religious matters. He equates religious freedom with freedom of conscience, and believes agnostics and atheists should enjoy the same civil rights as monotheists.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opini ... 05309&_r=0
TUNIS — “Islamism is dead!” announced Said Ferjani, a leader of the progressive wing of Ennahda, Tunisia’s main Islamist party, as we drank coffee in a hotel cafe here last month. Mr. Ferjani, a former hard-liner who once plotted a coup against the regime of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, was upbeat as he described the historic transition his party was about to make.
His wing had combined with the party leadership to push through a raft of resolutions that would not only rebrand Ennahda but also break with the tradition of political Islam that began with the Muslim Brotherhood, which was founded in Egypt in the late 1920s. According to Mr. Ferjani, Islamism had been useful under the Ben Ali dictatorship when “our identity and sense of purpose” was threatened by an authoritarian state. Now that Ennahda is engaged in open, legal party politics under a new Constitution, which it helped to write, and competes for national leadership, the Islamist label had become more a burden than a benefit.
The party’s co-founder and leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, was more circumspect when I interviewed him at his home. He shifted uneasily when I asked him whether he thought Islamism was dead.
“I wouldn’t put it that way,” he commented. But he did reject the label, saying, “We don’t see any reason to distinguish ourselves from other Muslims.” Both Mr. Ghannouchi and Mr. Ferjani prefer the term “Muslim Democrats” — which deliberately draws an analogy with the Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe — to describe their new, post-Islamist identity.
In particular, Mr. Ferjani’s explicit commitment to the principles of freedom and equality makes him perhaps the foremost post-Islamist political figure in the Sunni Arab world. While he calls himself a conservative and extols “family values,” Mr. Ferjani says he regards sexuality, sexual orientation and gender identity — including the transgender issues preoccupying the United States — as private and personal, and not matters for the state or legal authorities to prescribe.
Mr. Ferjani also adheres to the neutrality of the state on religious matters. He equates religious freedom with freedom of conscience, and believes agnostics and atheists should enjoy the same civil rights as monotheists.
More...
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/03/opini ... 05309&_r=0
Is Islam ‘Exceptional’?
How events from 14 centuries ago still shape the religion’s relationship to politics, and what that means for the future of the Middle East
To understand the Middle East’s seemingly intractable conflicts, we need to go back to at least 1924, the year the last caliphate was formally abolished. Animating the caliphate—the historical political entity governed by Islamic law and tradition—was the idea that, in the words of the historian Reza Pankhurst, the “spiritual unity of the Muslim community requires political expression.” For the better part of 13 centuries, there had been a continuous lineage of widely accepted “Islamic” politics. Even where caliphates were ineffectual, they still offered resonance and reassurance. Things were as they had always been and perhaps always would be.
Since the Ottoman Caliphate’s dissolution, the struggle to establish a legitimate political order has raged on in the Middle East, with varying levels of intensity. At its center is the problem of religion and its role in politics. In this sense, the turmoil of the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamic State, or ISIS, is only the latest iteration of the inability to resolve the most basic questions over what it means to be a citizen and what it means to be a state.
It is both an old and new question, one that used to have an answer but no longer does. Islam is distinctive in how it relates to politics—and this distinctiveness can be traced back to the religion’s founding moment in the seventh century. Islam is different. This difference has profound implications for the future of the Middle East and, by extension, for the world in which we all live, whether we happen to be American, French, British, or anything else. To say that Islam—as creed, theology, and practice—says something that other religions don’t quite say is admittedly a controversial, even troubling claim, especially in the context of rising anti-Muslim bigotry in the United States and Europe. As a Muslim-American, it’s personal for me: Donald Trump’s dangerous comments on Islam and Muslims make me fear for my country. Yet “Islamic exceptionalism” is neither good nor bad. It just is.
More...
http://www.theatlantic.com/internationa ... al/485801/
How events from 14 centuries ago still shape the religion’s relationship to politics, and what that means for the future of the Middle East
To understand the Middle East’s seemingly intractable conflicts, we need to go back to at least 1924, the year the last caliphate was formally abolished. Animating the caliphate—the historical political entity governed by Islamic law and tradition—was the idea that, in the words of the historian Reza Pankhurst, the “spiritual unity of the Muslim community requires political expression.” For the better part of 13 centuries, there had been a continuous lineage of widely accepted “Islamic” politics. Even where caliphates were ineffectual, they still offered resonance and reassurance. Things were as they had always been and perhaps always would be.
Since the Ottoman Caliphate’s dissolution, the struggle to establish a legitimate political order has raged on in the Middle East, with varying levels of intensity. At its center is the problem of religion and its role in politics. In this sense, the turmoil of the Arab Spring and the rise of the Islamic State, or ISIS, is only the latest iteration of the inability to resolve the most basic questions over what it means to be a citizen and what it means to be a state.
It is both an old and new question, one that used to have an answer but no longer does. Islam is distinctive in how it relates to politics—and this distinctiveness can be traced back to the religion’s founding moment in the seventh century. Islam is different. This difference has profound implications for the future of the Middle East and, by extension, for the world in which we all live, whether we happen to be American, French, British, or anything else. To say that Islam—as creed, theology, and practice—says something that other religions don’t quite say is admittedly a controversial, even troubling claim, especially in the context of rising anti-Muslim bigotry in the United States and Europe. As a Muslim-American, it’s personal for me: Donald Trump’s dangerous comments on Islam and Muslims make me fear for my country. Yet “Islamic exceptionalism” is neither good nor bad. It just is.
More...
http://www.theatlantic.com/internationa ... al/485801/
Indonesia Is Pushed to Ban Alcohol for Health of Bodies, if Not Souls
Extract:
Alcohol bans have been proposed before in Indonesia, by the same Islamic political parties that are pushing the current bill. Their scripture-based arguments gained little traction in Indonesia’s multifaith society, which is mostly Muslim but has a secular government.
But this time, those parties have taken a new line: that alcohol should be banned for health reasons, not religious reasons. And a passive response to the legislation by Indonesia’s dominant secular parties, which could have quashed it months ago, has some worried that it could become law.
“For me, it’s all about pluralism and human rights,” said Rudolf Dethu, a leader of two groups opposing the legislation, one of which organizes social events to promote the culinary aspects of beer.
“It’s not just about alcohol — there’s something bigger behind this,” Mr. Dethu said. “First it’s drinking, and then rules on who you can date and what time you can go out at night, and it’s not in the Indonesian culture to say no to authority.”
There have long been fears about creeping Islamization in Indonesia, which is the world’s most-populous Muslim-majority nation but has influential Christian, Hindu and Buddhist minorities. (The vast majority of Bali’s residents are Hindu.)
Political Islam has made gains here since Indonesia began moving toward democracy in 1998, after the ouster of its long-ruling authoritarian president, Suharto. In the past decade, autonomous regional governments have passed hundreds of local bylaws inspired by Islamic law, many of which enforce morality codes. The country’s Constitutional Court is currently hearing a petition by an Islamist group demanding that gay sex be outlawed, and that an existing adultery law be expanded to include sex between unmarried persons.
The bill before Parliament would ban the production, distribution, sale, consumption and possession of alcoholic beverages among Indonesians and foreign tourists alike. Violators could face up to 10 years in prison.
Critics of the Islamic parties backing the bill — which have the support of hard-line Muslim groups that have sometimes engaged in violent intimidation — say their concern for drinkers’ health is a cover for pushing Indonesia toward becoming an Islamic state under Shariah law
More...
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/world ... d=71987722
Extract:
Alcohol bans have been proposed before in Indonesia, by the same Islamic political parties that are pushing the current bill. Their scripture-based arguments gained little traction in Indonesia’s multifaith society, which is mostly Muslim but has a secular government.
But this time, those parties have taken a new line: that alcohol should be banned for health reasons, not religious reasons. And a passive response to the legislation by Indonesia’s dominant secular parties, which could have quashed it months ago, has some worried that it could become law.
“For me, it’s all about pluralism and human rights,” said Rudolf Dethu, a leader of two groups opposing the legislation, one of which organizes social events to promote the culinary aspects of beer.
“It’s not just about alcohol — there’s something bigger behind this,” Mr. Dethu said. “First it’s drinking, and then rules on who you can date and what time you can go out at night, and it’s not in the Indonesian culture to say no to authority.”
There have long been fears about creeping Islamization in Indonesia, which is the world’s most-populous Muslim-majority nation but has influential Christian, Hindu and Buddhist minorities. (The vast majority of Bali’s residents are Hindu.)
Political Islam has made gains here since Indonesia began moving toward democracy in 1998, after the ouster of its long-ruling authoritarian president, Suharto. In the past decade, autonomous regional governments have passed hundreds of local bylaws inspired by Islamic law, many of which enforce morality codes. The country’s Constitutional Court is currently hearing a petition by an Islamist group demanding that gay sex be outlawed, and that an existing adultery law be expanded to include sex between unmarried persons.
The bill before Parliament would ban the production, distribution, sale, consumption and possession of alcoholic beverages among Indonesians and foreign tourists alike. Violators could face up to 10 years in prison.
Critics of the Islamic parties backing the bill — which have the support of hard-line Muslim groups that have sometimes engaged in violent intimidation — say their concern for drinkers’ health is a cover for pushing Indonesia toward becoming an Islamic state under Shariah law
More...
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/03/world ... d=71987722
Bangladesh considering dropping Islam as state religion, according to senior minister
Government officials in Bangladesh are considering dropping Islam as the country’s national religion after a senior politician claimed Bangladeshi people have embraced “a force of secularism”.
Dr Abdur Razzak, a leading member of Bangladesh’s ruling Awami League party, proposed the religion be withdrawn from the country’s constitution during a discussion at the National Press Club in the capital Dhaka.
“Bangladesh is a country of communal harmony. Here we live with people from all religions and Islam should not be accommodated as the state religion in the Bangladeshi constitution,” Dr Razzak said in his report.
“I have said it abroad and now I am saying it again that Islam will be dropped from Bangladesh’s constitution when the time comes.
“The force of secularism is within the people of Bangladesh. There is no such thing as a ‘minority’ in our country.”
Dr Razzak added he believed Islam had been maintained as the state religion for “strategic reasons”, but declined to elaborate on this during the discussion.
Islam is the largest religion in Bangladesh, with a practicing Muslim population of approximately 150 million - making it the fourth largest Muslim population in the world after India, Pakistan and Indonesia.
According to a national survey from 2003, religion was the primary way Bangladeshi citizens identified themselves, and atheism was found to be rare.
During a recent speech, Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina highlighted the importance of “taking care” of those who follow minority religions.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 18366.html
Government officials in Bangladesh are considering dropping Islam as the country’s national religion after a senior politician claimed Bangladeshi people have embraced “a force of secularism”.
Dr Abdur Razzak, a leading member of Bangladesh’s ruling Awami League party, proposed the religion be withdrawn from the country’s constitution during a discussion at the National Press Club in the capital Dhaka.
“Bangladesh is a country of communal harmony. Here we live with people from all religions and Islam should not be accommodated as the state religion in the Bangladeshi constitution,” Dr Razzak said in his report.
“I have said it abroad and now I am saying it again that Islam will be dropped from Bangladesh’s constitution when the time comes.
“The force of secularism is within the people of Bangladesh. There is no such thing as a ‘minority’ in our country.”
Dr Razzak added he believed Islam had been maintained as the state religion for “strategic reasons”, but declined to elaborate on this during the discussion.
Islam is the largest religion in Bangladesh, with a practicing Muslim population of approximately 150 million - making it the fourth largest Muslim population in the world after India, Pakistan and Indonesia.
According to a national survey from 2003, religion was the primary way Bangladeshi citizens identified themselves, and atheism was found to be rare.
During a recent speech, Bangladeshi prime minister Sheikh Hasina highlighted the importance of “taking care” of those who follow minority religions.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world ... 18366.html
Indonesia’s blasphemy laws
Nov 24th 2016, 23:00by N.O. | JAKARTA
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economis ... lydispatch
INDONESIA is admired for successfully combining Islam and democracy. Yet this month police formally declared the country’s most prominent Christian politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, the governor (in effect, mayor) of Jakarta, to be a suspect in a blasphemy case. If convicted, Mr Purnama, known as Ahok, faces up to five years in prison. The case came in response to multiple complaints filed by hardline Islamists and threatens to do lasting damage to Indonesia’s democracy. It has also focused attention on the country’s blasphemy laws.
The laws date back to 1965. In keeping with its founding principles, which include belief in God, Indonesia criminalises any “deviation” from six officially recognised religions, as well as acts or words deemed “hostile” to God, without stating which one. During the 32-year rule of Suharto, Indonesia’s late strongman, the laws were rarely invoked. But since the country’s transformation into a vibrant free-speaking democracy after Suharto’s ouster in 1998, they have been used more frequently. Amnesty International, a human-rights group, counts at least 106 convictions since 2005. Often they target religious minorities, including Muslim minorities such as the Ahmadiyya, as well as those who have no religious faith at all. One recent case, in 2012, saw a 30-year-old civil servant jailed for two-and-a-half years for declaring himself an atheist on Facebook.
The use of blasphemy laws is linked to rising religious intolerance. In recent years hardline Islamists have become increasingly assertive, railing against deviants, heretics and their ilk. Muslim parties in parliament have pushed laws against alcohol, pornography and sexual minorities. Yet it is not at all clear that these moves have widespread support. Most Indonesians still vote for secular parties (they claimed 68% of the popular vote at the most recent legislative elections, in 2014) rather than religious ones. Many moderate Muslim leaders defend blasphemy laws on the grounds that they prevent violence by allowing religious disputes to be settled by the courts rather than vigilantes. However, moderates also blame politicians for misusing the laws to stir up sectarian tensions for their own ends. Ahok’s political rivals, for example, are seeking to use the laws to spoil his chances of becoming governor again in elections next year.
Whether for political or religious reasons, Indonesia’s use of blasphemy laws against Ahok (who also happens to be of Chinese descent) and against minorities more widely poses a serious challenge to its traditional tolerance. Ahok’s rise to one of the country’s most prominent political posts and his lead in the upcoming elections had come to be seen as proof that Indonesians could not be swayed by sectarian arguments. Indonesia’s democracy has already been damaged by the sight of a double minority being hounded by fanatics. Were Ahok to be convicted, the damage would be far worse.
Nov 24th 2016, 23:00by N.O. | JAKARTA
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economis ... lydispatch
INDONESIA is admired for successfully combining Islam and democracy. Yet this month police formally declared the country’s most prominent Christian politician, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, the governor (in effect, mayor) of Jakarta, to be a suspect in a blasphemy case. If convicted, Mr Purnama, known as Ahok, faces up to five years in prison. The case came in response to multiple complaints filed by hardline Islamists and threatens to do lasting damage to Indonesia’s democracy. It has also focused attention on the country’s blasphemy laws.
The laws date back to 1965. In keeping with its founding principles, which include belief in God, Indonesia criminalises any “deviation” from six officially recognised religions, as well as acts or words deemed “hostile” to God, without stating which one. During the 32-year rule of Suharto, Indonesia’s late strongman, the laws were rarely invoked. But since the country’s transformation into a vibrant free-speaking democracy after Suharto’s ouster in 1998, they have been used more frequently. Amnesty International, a human-rights group, counts at least 106 convictions since 2005. Often they target religious minorities, including Muslim minorities such as the Ahmadiyya, as well as those who have no religious faith at all. One recent case, in 2012, saw a 30-year-old civil servant jailed for two-and-a-half years for declaring himself an atheist on Facebook.
The use of blasphemy laws is linked to rising religious intolerance. In recent years hardline Islamists have become increasingly assertive, railing against deviants, heretics and their ilk. Muslim parties in parliament have pushed laws against alcohol, pornography and sexual minorities. Yet it is not at all clear that these moves have widespread support. Most Indonesians still vote for secular parties (they claimed 68% of the popular vote at the most recent legislative elections, in 2014) rather than religious ones. Many moderate Muslim leaders defend blasphemy laws on the grounds that they prevent violence by allowing religious disputes to be settled by the courts rather than vigilantes. However, moderates also blame politicians for misusing the laws to stir up sectarian tensions for their own ends. Ahok’s political rivals, for example, are seeking to use the laws to spoil his chances of becoming governor again in elections next year.
Whether for political or religious reasons, Indonesia’s use of blasphemy laws against Ahok (who also happens to be of Chinese descent) and against minorities more widely poses a serious challenge to its traditional tolerance. Ahok’s rise to one of the country’s most prominent political posts and his lead in the upcoming elections had come to be seen as proof that Indonesians could not be swayed by sectarian arguments. Indonesia’s democracy has already been damaged by the sight of a double minority being hounded by fanatics. Were Ahok to be convicted, the damage would be far worse.
In Indonesia, an Islamic Edict Seeks to Keep Santa Hats Off Muslims
Extract:
This month, the Indonesian Ulema Council, the country’s largest body of Islamic clerics, issued a religious edict barring Muslims from wearing Christmas-themed clothing, specifically those working in shopping malls, department stores and restaurants.
The council’s edict, known as a fatwa, is not legally binding, but it is nonetheless adding to growing political, ethnic and religious tensions prompted by the prosecution of Jakarta’s popular governor, who is Christian and ethnic Chinese, for blasphemy.
More
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/world ... 87722&_r=0
Extract:
This month, the Indonesian Ulema Council, the country’s largest body of Islamic clerics, issued a religious edict barring Muslims from wearing Christmas-themed clothing, specifically those working in shopping malls, department stores and restaurants.
The council’s edict, known as a fatwa, is not legally binding, but it is nonetheless adding to growing political, ethnic and religious tensions prompted by the prosecution of Jakarta’s popular governor, who is Christian and ethnic Chinese, for blasphemy.
More
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/world ... 87722&_r=0
To Secular Bangladeshis, Textbook Changes Are a Harbinger
Extract:
The changes were barely noticeable to the general public, but they alarmed some Bangladesh intellectuals, who saw them as the government’s accommodating a larger shift toward radical Islam.
Bangladesh has struggled to contain extremist violence in recent years, as Islamist militants have targeted secular writers and intellectuals. But equally significant, over the long term, are changes taking place in the general population: The number of women wearing the hijab has gradually risen, as has the number of students enrolled in madrasas, or Islamic schools.
That religious organizations now have a hand in editing textbooks, a prerogative they sought for years, suggests that their influence is growing, even with the Awami League party, which is avowedly secular, in power.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/worl ... d=71987722
Extract:
The changes were barely noticeable to the general public, but they alarmed some Bangladesh intellectuals, who saw them as the government’s accommodating a larger shift toward radical Islam.
Bangladesh has struggled to contain extremist violence in recent years, as Islamist militants have targeted secular writers and intellectuals. But equally significant, over the long term, are changes taking place in the general population: The number of women wearing the hijab has gradually risen, as has the number of students enrolled in madrasas, or Islamic schools.
That religious organizations now have a hand in editing textbooks, a prerogative they sought for years, suggests that their influence is growing, even with the Awami League party, which is avowedly secular, in power.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/22/worl ... d=71987722
Bangladesh’s Creeping Islamism
DHAKA, Bangladesh — Every year on the first day of school, students across Bangladesh wait eagerly for their new textbooks. Many have few extravagances in their lives, and for them that day is as thrilling as Christmas morning in other countries. Distributing over 360 million textbooks for free, on time, to more than 42 million children is no small feat, and it was a signature achievement for the ruling Awami League this year.
But public appreciation was quickly overtaken by outrage over the quiet revisions that appeared in books for classes ranging from primary grades to high school.
The Bengali letter “o” used to stand for “ol,” a yam; now it stands for “orna,” a scarf worn by women for modesty. Texts by non-Muslim writers — including some revered as part of Bengali heritage, like the classical poet Gyandas or the contemporary novelist Sunil Gangopadhyay — have been removed. Also gone are a small excerpt from the Ramayana, a Hindu classic that Islamists reject as foreign to the Muslim canon, and songs of the Sufi icon Lalon Shah, whose syncretic faith is anathema to Muslim conservatives.
This is exactly what Islamists have long wished for, particularly Hefazat-e-Islam, a network of madrasa leaders who hope to introduce Shariah in Bangladesh. But why these changes now, and from a nominally secular government that seems to have tried, if unevenly, to clamp down on Islamists in other ways?
The ruling Awami League has been criticized for being apathetic and blaming the victim during a spate of attacks in 2015 and 2016 against liberal bloggers, academics and religious minorities, some claimed by groups affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. It started cracking down hard after a massacre at a cafe in Dhaka last July. But even as the government tries to curb Islamist terrorism, in other respects it appears to waver between appeasing and containing nonviolent religious conservatives.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/opin ... ef=opinion
DHAKA, Bangladesh — Every year on the first day of school, students across Bangladesh wait eagerly for their new textbooks. Many have few extravagances in their lives, and for them that day is as thrilling as Christmas morning in other countries. Distributing over 360 million textbooks for free, on time, to more than 42 million children is no small feat, and it was a signature achievement for the ruling Awami League this year.
But public appreciation was quickly overtaken by outrage over the quiet revisions that appeared in books for classes ranging from primary grades to high school.
The Bengali letter “o” used to stand for “ol,” a yam; now it stands for “orna,” a scarf worn by women for modesty. Texts by non-Muslim writers — including some revered as part of Bengali heritage, like the classical poet Gyandas or the contemporary novelist Sunil Gangopadhyay — have been removed. Also gone are a small excerpt from the Ramayana, a Hindu classic that Islamists reject as foreign to the Muslim canon, and songs of the Sufi icon Lalon Shah, whose syncretic faith is anathema to Muslim conservatives.
This is exactly what Islamists have long wished for, particularly Hefazat-e-Islam, a network of madrasa leaders who hope to introduce Shariah in Bangladesh. But why these changes now, and from a nominally secular government that seems to have tried, if unevenly, to clamp down on Islamists in other ways?
The ruling Awami League has been criticized for being apathetic and blaming the victim during a spate of attacks in 2015 and 2016 against liberal bloggers, academics and religious minorities, some claimed by groups affiliated with Al Qaeda or the Islamic State. It started cracking down hard after a massacre at a cafe in Dhaka last July. But even as the government tries to curb Islamist terrorism, in other respects it appears to waver between appeasing and containing nonviolent religious conservatives.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/opin ... ef=opinion
The University of Chicago Shi'sm Studies Group Symposium
Call for Papers (CFP):
“Shi'sm and Governance”
Abstract submission deadline: February 24th, 2017
Symposium Date: May 12-13, 2017
The relationship between Shiʿism and governance—whether through doctrinal beliefs, political movements and ideologies, or practical exigencies—constitutes a highly relevant area of study within Islamic history and modern life. From the earliest disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad to current debates over Islamism and the modern state, various thinkers and movements within Shiʿism formulated original and innovative answers to the question of how Shiʿi communities should approach governance, politics, and communal relations in the larger societies within which they lived.
Given its historic minority status, how have Shiʿis theorized their position vis-à-vis caliphates they intrinsically rejected? How have Shiʿis legitimized or contested the rhetoric and practice of Shiʿi dynasties and governments once they came into power? How can we theorize Shiʿi pre-modern and modern notions of “governance” and the “political,” and is this a useful metric for understanding the relationship between Shiʿism and power? Finally, how have other schools of thought approached and responded to Shiʿi notions of governance or politics? We welcome contributions from scholars and graduate students working on these questions from any relevant scholarly perspective, including social, intellectual and political history, anthropology, sociology, political science, area studies, literature, and religious studies.
https://shii-studies-sites.uchicago.edu/
Call for Papers (CFP):
“Shi'sm and Governance”
Abstract submission deadline: February 24th, 2017
Symposium Date: May 12-13, 2017
The relationship between Shiʿism and governance—whether through doctrinal beliefs, political movements and ideologies, or practical exigencies—constitutes a highly relevant area of study within Islamic history and modern life. From the earliest disagreements over the succession to the Prophet Muhammad to current debates over Islamism and the modern state, various thinkers and movements within Shiʿism formulated original and innovative answers to the question of how Shiʿi communities should approach governance, politics, and communal relations in the larger societies within which they lived.
Given its historic minority status, how have Shiʿis theorized their position vis-à-vis caliphates they intrinsically rejected? How have Shiʿis legitimized or contested the rhetoric and practice of Shiʿi dynasties and governments once they came into power? How can we theorize Shiʿi pre-modern and modern notions of “governance” and the “political,” and is this a useful metric for understanding the relationship between Shiʿism and power? Finally, how have other schools of thought approached and responded to Shiʿi notions of governance or politics? We welcome contributions from scholars and graduate students working on these questions from any relevant scholarly perspective, including social, intellectual and political history, anthropology, sociology, political science, area studies, literature, and religious studies.
https://shii-studies-sites.uchicago.edu/
-
Kateeeeeeeeee
- Posts: 11
- Joined: Mon Feb 13, 2017 3:37 am
Hello everyone, My name is Katiya. I am a Ukrainian who has been retained to launch an Ismaili website. I need some help with content. Therefore i decided to search an Ismaili website to find someone who is an Ismaili and can help with this Project. Once the site has been launched, we will be looking for full time staff in maintaining this world wide website. Please contact me on my email [email protected] if you are able too assist. Thank you very much Katiya.
Turkey Drops Evolution From Curriculum, Angering Secularists
ISTANBUL — Turkey has removed the concept of evolution from its high school curriculum, in what critics fear is the latest attempt by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to erode the country’s secular character.
Starting in September, a chapter on evolution will no longer appear in ninth graders’ textbooks because it is considered too “controversial” an idea, an official announced this week.
“Our students don’t have the necessary scientific background and information-based context needed to comprehend” the debate about evolution, said the official, Alpaslan Durmus, the chairman of the Education Ministry’s Education and Discipline Board, which decides the curriculum, in a video posted on the ministry’s website.
The news has deepened concerns among Mr. Erdogan’s critics that the president, a conservative Muslim, wants to radically change the identity of a country that was founded in 1923 along staunchly secular lines.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/worl ... d=71987722
ISTANBUL — Turkey has removed the concept of evolution from its high school curriculum, in what critics fear is the latest attempt by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government to erode the country’s secular character.
Starting in September, a chapter on evolution will no longer appear in ninth graders’ textbooks because it is considered too “controversial” an idea, an official announced this week.
“Our students don’t have the necessary scientific background and information-based context needed to comprehend” the debate about evolution, said the official, Alpaslan Durmus, the chairman of the Education Ministry’s Education and Discipline Board, which decides the curriculum, in a video posted on the ministry’s website.
The news has deepened concerns among Mr. Erdogan’s critics that the president, a conservative Muslim, wants to radically change the identity of a country that was founded in 1923 along staunchly secular lines.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/worl ... d=71987722
Blanket repression is the wrong way to deal with political Islamists
Their record in power is often worrying. But they can be pragmatic and cannot be ignored
Excerpt:
Islamist groups come in many forms, from Ennahda, the Tunisians who call themselves “Muslim democrats”, to Hamas, the Palestinians who dispatched suicide-bombers to Israel. Those who would suppress them all make three errors: they claim Islamists are all the same; they say they are fundamentally undemocratic; and they think the solution lies with strongmen.
More...
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/ ... na/58348/n
Their record in power is often worrying. But they can be pragmatic and cannot be ignored
Excerpt:
Islamist groups come in many forms, from Ennahda, the Tunisians who call themselves “Muslim democrats”, to Hamas, the Palestinians who dispatched suicide-bombers to Israel. Those who would suppress them all make three errors: they claim Islamists are all the same; they say they are fundamentally undemocratic; and they think the solution lies with strongmen.
More...
https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/ ... na/58348/n
In Turkey’s New Curriculum, Ataturk, Darwin and Jihad Get Face-Lifts
When high school students in Turkey arrive for the fall term, Charles Darwin will be conspicuously absent from biology classes.
In elementary school religion classes, teachers will promote the nonviolent meaning of the word jihad — “to struggle” — as “love of homeland.”
And, perhaps most significantly in a country where the image of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who created the modern secular Turkish state in 1923, is plastered everywhere, references in schools to Ataturk are expected to be downgraded.
In a majority Muslim country that has long been polarized between the religious majority and a minority of secular elites, critics said the overhaul of more than 170 curriculum topics by the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan represented a frontal assault on the country’s already fragile tradition of secularism.
........
Education is just the latest area where the simmering culture war between Islam and secularism in Turkey has been laid bare.
When Mr. Erdogan came to power in 2002, he vowed to improve the status of the religious majority of Turkey, who had been suppressed by the ruling secular elite, and the prohibition of head scarves at universities was lifted in 2011. That was extended to state offices in 2013, and this year, the scrapping of the ban was extended to the army, long seen as the final safeguard of the country’s vaunted secularism.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/worl ... d=45305309
When high school students in Turkey arrive for the fall term, Charles Darwin will be conspicuously absent from biology classes.
In elementary school religion classes, teachers will promote the nonviolent meaning of the word jihad — “to struggle” — as “love of homeland.”
And, perhaps most significantly in a country where the image of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, who created the modern secular Turkish state in 1923, is plastered everywhere, references in schools to Ataturk are expected to be downgraded.
In a majority Muslim country that has long been polarized between the religious majority and a minority of secular elites, critics said the overhaul of more than 170 curriculum topics by the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan represented a frontal assault on the country’s already fragile tradition of secularism.
........
Education is just the latest area where the simmering culture war between Islam and secularism in Turkey has been laid bare.
When Mr. Erdogan came to power in 2002, he vowed to improve the status of the religious majority of Turkey, who had been suppressed by the ruling secular elite, and the prohibition of head scarves at universities was lifted in 2011. That was extended to state offices in 2013, and this year, the scrapping of the ban was extended to the army, long seen as the final safeguard of the country’s vaunted secularism.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/18/worl ... d=45305309
https://dailytimes.com.pk/129031/letter-from-deathbed/
Letter from deathbed
Just as Aga Khan University in Karachi is the place to go to get your neurosurgical needs met, the premier place for cardiovascular surgery in Pakistan is Tahir Heart Institute in Rabwah, run by Ahmadis
Yasser Latif Hamdani
OCTOBER 23, 2017 BY SAJID SALAMAT
This past week I entrusted my life to the most skilled set of surgical hands at the Aga Khan University (AKU) in Karachi (named after Aga Khan, the first president of the All India Muslim League). A monstrous tumour on the right lobe of the brain was plaguing my existence. Given time, it could have claimed my life but through a cutting-edge surgical technique called awake craniotomy, the brilliant surgeons at AKU saved my life.
Awake craniotomy is one of the most extraordinary surgical procedures. You are kept awake as your brain is cut open, so that your eloquent brain is kept intact. When one has been gone as close to the reality of life (which after all is death) as I did, one only remembers beautiful and tender moments and all the rest becomes a half veiled mist of unrealities. So this is my letter to you Pakistanis from what is effectively my deathbed.
Procedures like awake craniotomy characterise real progress — as opposed to making bombs and blowing up human settlement and mixing religion with statecraft by adding it to the country’s constitution is not real progress I’m afraid. This is what Pakistan needs to understand.
When the AKU had started its state of the art secondary education system about 15 years ago, religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami (it must be remembered that the party had shamelessly opposed the creation of this country) had accused Ismailis of trying to ‘secularise’ Pakistan (as if that is such a bad thing) and destroy its Islamic ethos. Such shameless acts remind one of that Urdu language phrase: ‘sharam tum ko magar nahi aati’. Jamaat-e-Islami’s and its leader Maulana Maududi’s hateful discourse against Pakistan and Jinnah is all part of the historical record. Yet these JI wallahs and their supporters like MNA Captain (retd) Safdar have become the uncles of Pakistan’s ideology. I have written in detail about Captain Safdar’s vitriol against another patriotic community of Pakistan — the Ahmadis — in my previous article. The shameless son-in-law of the now thoroughly discredited former Prime Minister of Pakistan had the gall to declare that a ‘sazshi-tola’ (a conspiratorial gang) appointed Sir Zafrullah Khan as Pakistan’s foreign minister. He should know that if there was such a ‘sazshi-tola’ it was headed by none other than Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It was Jinnah who appointed Zafrullah as Pakistan’s lawyer before the boundary commission and it was Jinnah who asked Ispahani to send back Zafrullah to take over as Pakistan’s first foreign minister. Jinnah had referred to Zafrullah Khan as ‘my Muslim son’ on numerous occasions. How dare this shameless son-in-law of a disqualified Prime Minister refer to the team led by the founder of the nation as a ‘sazshi-tola’. Those of you who have followed my writings here know that I am not a supporter of a judicial coup against an elected government and I have not agreed with Supreme Court’s Iqama judgment but if democracy means sustaining the shamefulness and bigotry of people like Captain Safdar on account of the fact that he is married to the daughter of the then PM, then I am afraid we all have to reconsider our opinions.
Just as Aga Khan University in Karachi is the place to go to get your neurosurgical needs met, the premier place for cardiovascular surgery in Pakistan is Tahir Heart Institute in Rabwah — run by Ahmadis. It is also common knowledge that some of our best schools, hospitals and universities are run by Christian minorities. Pakistan is not just for constitutionally sanctioned Muslims. Pakistan is for all Pakistanis regardless of their faith. The country is sustained through the goodwill and efforts of all Pakistanis, especially non-Muslims.
When Captain Safdar’s antecedents in Majlis-e-Ahrar, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ulema-Hind were trying to destroy the foundations of this country and abusing Jinnah as Kafir-e-Azam and Pakistan as Kafiristan, it was the Aga Khanis, Ahmadis, Christians, Dalits and scheduled caste Hindus who stood with Jinnah against Majlis-e-Ahrar and other traitors like Khaksars, Khudai Khidmatgars and Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind — all of whom had sold themselves to the Indian National Congress.
As I have mentioned in my last two articles — it bears repeating that the 1973 constitution and the horrendous 2nd Amendment to this constitution were passed by individuals like Wali Khan, Mufti Mahmood, Maula Bux Soomro and others who had opposed the very making of Pakistan. Upon the fall of Dacca in 1971, Mufti Mahmood, father of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, famously declared ‘thank God we were not part of the sin of making Pakistan’. During General Zia’s time, Maula Bux Soomro declared equally famously ‘I am proud of the fact that my family including Allah Bux Soomro opposed the making of Pakistan’. Soomro’s son Illahi Bux Soomro tragically has been establishment’s go to man in Sindh for decades now.
The point of repeating this history is to make sure that it is clear to everyone. The only way Pakistan can progress is by unwaveringly, unquestioningly and unstintingly following Jinnah’s prescription of August 11, 1947, wherein he clarified that religion had nothing to do with the business of the state and that every Pakistani is an equal citizen of the state, and it does not matter if one is a Hindu, a Muslim, a Catholic or a Protestant. Religion is just not the point.
Letter from deathbed
Just as Aga Khan University in Karachi is the place to go to get your neurosurgical needs met, the premier place for cardiovascular surgery in Pakistan is Tahir Heart Institute in Rabwah, run by Ahmadis
Yasser Latif Hamdani
OCTOBER 23, 2017 BY SAJID SALAMAT
This past week I entrusted my life to the most skilled set of surgical hands at the Aga Khan University (AKU) in Karachi (named after Aga Khan, the first president of the All India Muslim League). A monstrous tumour on the right lobe of the brain was plaguing my existence. Given time, it could have claimed my life but through a cutting-edge surgical technique called awake craniotomy, the brilliant surgeons at AKU saved my life.
Awake craniotomy is one of the most extraordinary surgical procedures. You are kept awake as your brain is cut open, so that your eloquent brain is kept intact. When one has been gone as close to the reality of life (which after all is death) as I did, one only remembers beautiful and tender moments and all the rest becomes a half veiled mist of unrealities. So this is my letter to you Pakistanis from what is effectively my deathbed.
Procedures like awake craniotomy characterise real progress — as opposed to making bombs and blowing up human settlement and mixing religion with statecraft by adding it to the country’s constitution is not real progress I’m afraid. This is what Pakistan needs to understand.
When the AKU had started its state of the art secondary education system about 15 years ago, religious parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami (it must be remembered that the party had shamelessly opposed the creation of this country) had accused Ismailis of trying to ‘secularise’ Pakistan (as if that is such a bad thing) and destroy its Islamic ethos. Such shameless acts remind one of that Urdu language phrase: ‘sharam tum ko magar nahi aati’. Jamaat-e-Islami’s and its leader Maulana Maududi’s hateful discourse against Pakistan and Jinnah is all part of the historical record. Yet these JI wallahs and their supporters like MNA Captain (retd) Safdar have become the uncles of Pakistan’s ideology. I have written in detail about Captain Safdar’s vitriol against another patriotic community of Pakistan — the Ahmadis — in my previous article. The shameless son-in-law of the now thoroughly discredited former Prime Minister of Pakistan had the gall to declare that a ‘sazshi-tola’ (a conspiratorial gang) appointed Sir Zafrullah Khan as Pakistan’s foreign minister. He should know that if there was such a ‘sazshi-tola’ it was headed by none other than Mohammad Ali Jinnah. It was Jinnah who appointed Zafrullah as Pakistan’s lawyer before the boundary commission and it was Jinnah who asked Ispahani to send back Zafrullah to take over as Pakistan’s first foreign minister. Jinnah had referred to Zafrullah Khan as ‘my Muslim son’ on numerous occasions. How dare this shameless son-in-law of a disqualified Prime Minister refer to the team led by the founder of the nation as a ‘sazshi-tola’. Those of you who have followed my writings here know that I am not a supporter of a judicial coup against an elected government and I have not agreed with Supreme Court’s Iqama judgment but if democracy means sustaining the shamefulness and bigotry of people like Captain Safdar on account of the fact that he is married to the daughter of the then PM, then I am afraid we all have to reconsider our opinions.
Just as Aga Khan University in Karachi is the place to go to get your neurosurgical needs met, the premier place for cardiovascular surgery in Pakistan is Tahir Heart Institute in Rabwah — run by Ahmadis. It is also common knowledge that some of our best schools, hospitals and universities are run by Christian minorities. Pakistan is not just for constitutionally sanctioned Muslims. Pakistan is for all Pakistanis regardless of their faith. The country is sustained through the goodwill and efforts of all Pakistanis, especially non-Muslims.
When Captain Safdar’s antecedents in Majlis-e-Ahrar, Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamiat-e-Ulema-Hind were trying to destroy the foundations of this country and abusing Jinnah as Kafir-e-Azam and Pakistan as Kafiristan, it was the Aga Khanis, Ahmadis, Christians, Dalits and scheduled caste Hindus who stood with Jinnah against Majlis-e-Ahrar and other traitors like Khaksars, Khudai Khidmatgars and Jamiat-e-Ulema Hind — all of whom had sold themselves to the Indian National Congress.
As I have mentioned in my last two articles — it bears repeating that the 1973 constitution and the horrendous 2nd Amendment to this constitution were passed by individuals like Wali Khan, Mufti Mahmood, Maula Bux Soomro and others who had opposed the very making of Pakistan. Upon the fall of Dacca in 1971, Mufti Mahmood, father of Maulana Fazlur Rahman, famously declared ‘thank God we were not part of the sin of making Pakistan’. During General Zia’s time, Maula Bux Soomro declared equally famously ‘I am proud of the fact that my family including Allah Bux Soomro opposed the making of Pakistan’. Soomro’s son Illahi Bux Soomro tragically has been establishment’s go to man in Sindh for decades now.
The point of repeating this history is to make sure that it is clear to everyone. The only way Pakistan can progress is by unwaveringly, unquestioningly and unstintingly following Jinnah’s prescription of August 11, 1947, wherein he clarified that religion had nothing to do with the business of the state and that every Pakistani is an equal citizen of the state, and it does not matter if one is a Hindu, a Muslim, a Catholic or a Protestant. Religion is just not the point.
Does Religion Make People Moral?
Over the past 15 years, my country, Turkey, has gone through a colossal political revolution. The traditional secular elite that identifies with the nation’s modernist founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, has been replaced by religious conservatives who, until recently, were largely powerless and marginalized. The religious conservatives have by now come to dominate virtually all institutions of the state, as well as the media and even much of the business sector. In short, they have become the new ruling elite.
This political revolution has had an inadvertent outcome. It has tested the ostensible virtues of these religious conservatives — and they have failed. They have failed this test so terribly that it raises the question of whether religiosity and morality really go hand in hand, as so many religious people like to claim.
The religious conservatives have morally failed because they ended up doing everything that they once condemned as unjust and cruel. For decades, they criticized the secular elite for nepotism and corruption, for weaponizing the judiciary and for using the news media to demonize and intimidate their opponents. Yet after their initial years in power, they began repeating all of the same behavior they used to condemn, often even more blatantly than their predecessors.
This is a familiar story: The religious conservatives have become corrupted by power. But power corrupts more easily when you have neither principles nor integrity.
Notably, some of the more conscientious voices among Turkey’s religious conservatives criticize this ugly reality. Mustafa Ozturk, a popular theologian and a newspaper columnist, recently declared that religious conservatives are failing the moral test miserably. He wrote: “For the next 40 to 50 years, we Muslims will have no right to say anything to any human being about faith, morals, rights and law. The response, ‘We have seen you as well,’ will be a slap in our face.”
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opin ... pe=article
Over the past 15 years, my country, Turkey, has gone through a colossal political revolution. The traditional secular elite that identifies with the nation’s modernist founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, has been replaced by religious conservatives who, until recently, were largely powerless and marginalized. The religious conservatives have by now come to dominate virtually all institutions of the state, as well as the media and even much of the business sector. In short, they have become the new ruling elite.
This political revolution has had an inadvertent outcome. It has tested the ostensible virtues of these religious conservatives — and they have failed. They have failed this test so terribly that it raises the question of whether religiosity and morality really go hand in hand, as so many religious people like to claim.
The religious conservatives have morally failed because they ended up doing everything that they once condemned as unjust and cruel. For decades, they criticized the secular elite for nepotism and corruption, for weaponizing the judiciary and for using the news media to demonize and intimidate their opponents. Yet after their initial years in power, they began repeating all of the same behavior they used to condemn, often even more blatantly than their predecessors.
This is a familiar story: The religious conservatives have become corrupted by power. But power corrupts more easily when you have neither principles nor integrity.
Notably, some of the more conscientious voices among Turkey’s religious conservatives criticize this ugly reality. Mustafa Ozturk, a popular theologian and a newspaper columnist, recently declared that religious conservatives are failing the moral test miserably. He wrote: “For the next 40 to 50 years, we Muslims will have no right to say anything to any human being about faith, morals, rights and law. The response, ‘We have seen you as well,’ will be a slap in our face.”
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opin ... pe=article
Jamal Khashoggi and the Competing Visions of Islam
The growing tensions between Turkey and Saudi Arabia after the murder of the Saudi journalist in Istanbul remind us of an older conflict between monarchical and republican Islam.
Jamal Khashoggi’s murder by Saudi agents in Istanbul doesn’t just cast a harsh light on the authoritarian and reckless behavior of Prince Mohamad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia; it also highlights the rivalry between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which represent competing forms of Islam.
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that allows Islam to define all social relations as long as it makes no political claims. Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, is a republic whose government was brought to power by the votes of many conservative Muslims.
Despite being an influential Saudi voice, Mr. Khashoggi had over the years embraced these competing visions of governance and the place of Islam in politics. He had been a loyal adviser to Saudi rulers, but he also, like Mr. Erdogan and his party, is widely believed to have subscribed to the Islamist ideal of power democratically achieved — an ideal represented by the Muslim Brotherhood.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/opin ... dline&te=1
The growing tensions between Turkey and Saudi Arabia after the murder of the Saudi journalist in Istanbul remind us of an older conflict between monarchical and republican Islam.
Jamal Khashoggi’s murder by Saudi agents in Istanbul doesn’t just cast a harsh light on the authoritarian and reckless behavior of Prince Mohamad bin Salman of Saudi Arabia; it also highlights the rivalry between Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which represent competing forms of Islam.
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy that allows Islam to define all social relations as long as it makes no political claims. Turkey, led by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, is a republic whose government was brought to power by the votes of many conservative Muslims.
Despite being an influential Saudi voice, Mr. Khashoggi had over the years embraced these competing visions of governance and the place of Islam in politics. He had been a loyal adviser to Saudi rulers, but he also, like Mr. Erdogan and his party, is widely believed to have subscribed to the Islamist ideal of power democratically achieved — an ideal represented by the Muslim Brotherhood.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/24/opin ... dline&te=1
Saudi Arabia Is Misusing Mecca
In the aftermath of the Jamal Khashoggi murder, the kingdom has exploited the podium of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by using its imams to praise, sanctify and defend the rulers and their actions.
When an imam of the Grand Mosque calls upon Muslims to obediently accept Prince Mohammed’s incredulous narrative about the murder of Mr. Khashoggi; to accept his abduction, jailing and torture of dissenters, including imprisonment of several revered Islamic scholars; to ignore his pitiless and cruel war in Yemen, his undermining the democratic dreams in the Arab world, his support for the oppressive dictatorship in Egypt, it makes it impossible to accept the imam’s categorization of the crown prince as a divinely inspired reformer. The sanctified podium of the prophet in Mecca is being desecrated and defiled.
The control of Mecca and Medina has enabled the clerical establishment and the monarchy flush with oil money to extend their literalist and rigid interpretations of Islam beyond the borders of the kingdom. Most Muslims will always prefer a tolerant and ethically conscientious Islam to the variant championed by the crown prince and the acquiescent Saudi clergy.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/opin ... dline&te=1
In the aftermath of the Jamal Khashoggi murder, the kingdom has exploited the podium of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by using its imams to praise, sanctify and defend the rulers and their actions.
When an imam of the Grand Mosque calls upon Muslims to obediently accept Prince Mohammed’s incredulous narrative about the murder of Mr. Khashoggi; to accept his abduction, jailing and torture of dissenters, including imprisonment of several revered Islamic scholars; to ignore his pitiless and cruel war in Yemen, his undermining the democratic dreams in the Arab world, his support for the oppressive dictatorship in Egypt, it makes it impossible to accept the imam’s categorization of the crown prince as a divinely inspired reformer. The sanctified podium of the prophet in Mecca is being desecrated and defiled.
The control of Mecca and Medina has enabled the clerical establishment and the monarchy flush with oil money to extend their literalist and rigid interpretations of Islam beyond the borders of the kingdom. Most Muslims will always prefer a tolerant and ethically conscientious Islam to the variant championed by the crown prince and the acquiescent Saudi clergy.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/12/opin ... dline&te=1
Blasphemy Laws: An Excuse for Persecution
Dozens of countries still have laws against profane or impious speech, some carrying the death penalty. Such laws should be scrapped.
Excerpt:
Blasphemy laws are most common, and most commonly enforced, in Muslim countries, and the penalties are often brutal. Ms. Bibi was sentenced to be hanged; Iran executed 20 people in 2015 for “enmity against God,” and in Saudi Arabia, adhering to the wrong branch of Islam can mean death.
Sacrilege is painful to religious believers everywhere. But broad and subjective legal proscriptions not only contradict the fundamental right to freedom of expression; they also open the door to persecution of minority faiths, as in Ms. Bibi’s case, or of political dissidents. In Russia, the Pussy Riot band was imprisoned for “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred,” though their target was not religion but Vladimir Putin.
History supplies ample evidence that when religions proclaim themselves beyond criticism or challenge, there is hell to pay. Or, as the Anglican archbishop of New Zealand, Philip Richardson, said on learning to his surprise that his country had a “blasphemy libel” law, “My view is, God’s bigger than needing to be defended by the Crimes Act.”
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/opin ... dline&te=1
Dozens of countries still have laws against profane or impious speech, some carrying the death penalty. Such laws should be scrapped.
Excerpt:
Blasphemy laws are most common, and most commonly enforced, in Muslim countries, and the penalties are often brutal. Ms. Bibi was sentenced to be hanged; Iran executed 20 people in 2015 for “enmity against God,” and in Saudi Arabia, adhering to the wrong branch of Islam can mean death.
Sacrilege is painful to religious believers everywhere. But broad and subjective legal proscriptions not only contradict the fundamental right to freedom of expression; they also open the door to persecution of minority faiths, as in Ms. Bibi’s case, or of political dissidents. In Russia, the Pussy Riot band was imprisoned for “hooliganism motivated by religious hatred,” though their target was not religion but Vladimir Putin.
History supplies ample evidence that when religions proclaim themselves beyond criticism or challenge, there is hell to pay. Or, as the Anglican archbishop of New Zealand, Philip Richardson, said on learning to his surprise that his country had a “blasphemy libel” law, “My view is, God’s bigger than needing to be defended by the Crimes Act.”
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/opin ... dline&te=1
Islam and soft power
The varieties of Muslim faith become a vital form of diplomacy
A concept born in the cold war comes home to roost
ABOUT 30 YEARS ago, in the final years of the cold war, the American political scientist Joseph Nye developed the concept of soft power. He meant the ability of countries and alliances to gain influence in the world, and prevail over rivals, not through weapons or economic heft but by the seductive power of their culture, products and way of life. Although in principle any state or system can wield soft power, the concept was first used to compliment the infectious attractiveness of American music, films and youth culture, which was seen as one of the several factors that wooed foreigners away from their loyalty to drab, gerontocratic communist regimes.
In the 21st century, students of world affairs will have to sharpen their understanding of a related but distinctly different phenomenon: the projection of religious soft power, mainly in the form of rival versions of Islam. That, at least, is the contention of two senior fellows at Brookings, a think-tank in Washington, DC. Peter Mandaville and Shadi Hamid have just published a 30-page paper as a foretaste of a project that will look in more detail at the dissemination of religious influence by individual countries.
As they point out, religious soft power in the realm of Islam is associated in many people’s minds with one binary contest. The rulers of Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively, spread Sunni pietism with a fundamentalist edge, and a brand of Shia Islam that goes long on grievance, victimhood and resistance to the existing world order.
More...
https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2018/ ... m=20181120
The varieties of Muslim faith become a vital form of diplomacy
A concept born in the cold war comes home to roost
ABOUT 30 YEARS ago, in the final years of the cold war, the American political scientist Joseph Nye developed the concept of soft power. He meant the ability of countries and alliances to gain influence in the world, and prevail over rivals, not through weapons or economic heft but by the seductive power of their culture, products and way of life. Although in principle any state or system can wield soft power, the concept was first used to compliment the infectious attractiveness of American music, films and youth culture, which was seen as one of the several factors that wooed foreigners away from their loyalty to drab, gerontocratic communist regimes.
In the 21st century, students of world affairs will have to sharpen their understanding of a related but distinctly different phenomenon: the projection of religious soft power, mainly in the form of rival versions of Islam. That, at least, is the contention of two senior fellows at Brookings, a think-tank in Washington, DC. Peter Mandaville and Shadi Hamid have just published a 30-page paper as a foretaste of a project that will look in more detail at the dissemination of religious influence by individual countries.
As they point out, religious soft power in the realm of Islam is associated in many people’s minds with one binary contest. The rulers of Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively, spread Sunni pietism with a fundamentalist edge, and a brand of Shia Islam that goes long on grievance, victimhood and resistance to the existing world order.
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https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2018/ ... m=20181120
Webcast: Milad-un-Nabi Lecture 2018
The Arab Spring — Quest for Social Justice,
Video: (1 hr 15 min)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_cont ... MMOF0n1WFg
The Arab Spring — Quest for Social Justice,
Video: (1 hr 15 min)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_cont ... MMOF0n1WFg
The Iran Revolution at 40: From Theocracy to ‘Normality’
Excerpt:
New rules were put in effect to forbid anything that might lead people astray and prevent them from ascending to a heavenly afterlife: strict controls on the media, which isolated Iranians from Western influences; an absolute segregation of the sexes in public places; compulsory head scarves for women; bans on alcohol and musical instruments on television; rules forbidding women to ride bicycles. It went on and on, zealously and sometimes brutally enforced by the morality police and the paramilitary Basij forces.
But over the years, as the early revolutionary fervor gave way for most people to a yearning for a more normal existence, the rules became negotiable. While the political system is basically the same as in those early years, the society changed slowly, at times almost imperceptibly. Those changes have been enormous, and the Iran celebrating the 40th anniversary of the revolution on Feb. 11 is closer than most outsiders generally appreciate to being that “normal” country Iranians want.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/10/worl ... 3053090211
Excerpt:
New rules were put in effect to forbid anything that might lead people astray and prevent them from ascending to a heavenly afterlife: strict controls on the media, which isolated Iranians from Western influences; an absolute segregation of the sexes in public places; compulsory head scarves for women; bans on alcohol and musical instruments on television; rules forbidding women to ride bicycles. It went on and on, zealously and sometimes brutally enforced by the morality police and the paramilitary Basij forces.
But over the years, as the early revolutionary fervor gave way for most people to a yearning for a more normal existence, the rules became negotiable. While the political system is basically the same as in those early years, the society changed slowly, at times almost imperceptibly. Those changes have been enormous, and the Iran celebrating the 40th anniversary of the revolution on Feb. 11 is closer than most outsiders generally appreciate to being that “normal” country Iranians want.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/10/worl ... 3053090211
Indonesia’s Next Election Is in April.
The Islamists Have Already Won.
How religion has come to dominate our politics.
JAKARTA, Indonesia — When Joko Widodo, the incumbent president of Indonesia, last year chose Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate for the general election this April, it became clear that Indonesian politics is now backed into a corner. Mr. Ma’ruf is an Islamic cleric and scholar, and Mr. Joko was perhaps hoping to dampen attacks from conservative and radical Islamic groups that have called him anti-Islam (even though he is Muslim himself). Instead, he has built a Trojan horse for his opponents outside the walls of his own city.
The presidential race, in which Mr. Joko is again facing Prabowo Subianto, a ex-army general and former son-in-law of the dictator Suharto, looks like a replay of the 2014 contest. Back then, Mr. Joko won by a small margin, on a platform promising a grand maritime strategy for Indonesia and to revitalize the economy partly through major infrastructure projects. This year, it seems, the decisive issue will be the candidates’ professed commitment to Islam.
Mr. Joko and Mr. Prabowo are scheduled to meet for their second debate on Feb. 17, and the agenda will focus on natural resources, infrastructure and the environment. But soon enough, the main issue of this election — religion — will return to the fore.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/opin ... dline&te=1
The Islamists Have Already Won.
How religion has come to dominate our politics.
JAKARTA, Indonesia — When Joko Widodo, the incumbent president of Indonesia, last year chose Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate for the general election this April, it became clear that Indonesian politics is now backed into a corner. Mr. Ma’ruf is an Islamic cleric and scholar, and Mr. Joko was perhaps hoping to dampen attacks from conservative and radical Islamic groups that have called him anti-Islam (even though he is Muslim himself). Instead, he has built a Trojan horse for his opponents outside the walls of his own city.
The presidential race, in which Mr. Joko is again facing Prabowo Subianto, a ex-army general and former son-in-law of the dictator Suharto, looks like a replay of the 2014 contest. Back then, Mr. Joko won by a small margin, on a platform promising a grand maritime strategy for Indonesia and to revitalize the economy partly through major infrastructure projects. This year, it seems, the decisive issue will be the candidates’ professed commitment to Islam.
Mr. Joko and Mr. Prabowo are scheduled to meet for their second debate on Feb. 17, and the agenda will focus on natural resources, infrastructure and the environment. But soon enough, the main issue of this election — religion — will return to the fore.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/14/opin ... dline&te=1
MAR 13
Pragmatic Muslim Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
by Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations
Free
Date And Time
Wed, 13 March 2019
18:00 – 19:30 GMT
Location: Aga Khan Centre
Description
Andreas Johansson will talk about his book entitled Pragmatic Muslim Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress. This book analyses and discusses the use of Islamic terms and symbols in the political party Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), a Muslim political party that has been part of the democratic process in Sri Lanka since the 1980s. It is based on interviews with the leading members of the party and on analyses of the party’s official documents. It describes the history of Muslims in Sri Lanka, presents the analytical framework used, and discusses the official documents and narratives of party members, as well as the details of the Ashraff and Hakeem terms in Parliament. The book provides knowledge about the state of religion and politics in Sri Lanka, and provides insight into how a religious political Muslim party functions as a pragmatic rather than fundamentalist movement. Representing a recent study on the complex relationship between religion and politics, this book greatly advances the understanding of the power of religion and its effect on both individual lives and society.
More and registration:
https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/pragmati ... 6810187801
Pragmatic Muslim Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress
by Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations
Free
Date And Time
Wed, 13 March 2019
18:00 – 19:30 GMT
Location: Aga Khan Centre
Description
Andreas Johansson will talk about his book entitled Pragmatic Muslim Politics – The Case of Sri Lanka Muslim Congress. This book analyses and discusses the use of Islamic terms and symbols in the political party Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC), a Muslim political party that has been part of the democratic process in Sri Lanka since the 1980s. It is based on interviews with the leading members of the party and on analyses of the party’s official documents. It describes the history of Muslims in Sri Lanka, presents the analytical framework used, and discusses the official documents and narratives of party members, as well as the details of the Ashraff and Hakeem terms in Parliament. The book provides knowledge about the state of religion and politics in Sri Lanka, and provides insight into how a religious political Muslim party functions as a pragmatic rather than fundamentalist movement. Representing a recent study on the complex relationship between religion and politics, this book greatly advances the understanding of the power of religion and its effect on both individual lives and society.
More and registration:
https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/pragmati ... 6810187801
In Istanbul, Erdogan Remakes Taksim Square, a Symbol of Secular Turkey
ISTANBUL — The skeleton of a large new mosque has risen up on the west side of Istanbul’s Taksim Square in the last year, dwarfing the monument to the secular Turkish republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and commanding the public space.
And as the mosque was going up, a beloved symbol of the Ataturk era, Istanbul’s opera house, was demolished.
Few Turks oppose the mosque — although some question its size and derivative Ottoman design — but the symbolism of a house of worship dominating the monuments of Ataturk’s secular republic is not lost on Istanbul residents.
Photos and more...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/worl ... 3053090324
ISTANBUL — The skeleton of a large new mosque has risen up on the west side of Istanbul’s Taksim Square in the last year, dwarfing the monument to the secular Turkish republic’s founder Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and commanding the public space.
And as the mosque was going up, a beloved symbol of the Ataturk era, Istanbul’s opera house, was demolished.
Few Turks oppose the mosque — although some question its size and derivative Ottoman design — but the symbolism of a house of worship dominating the monuments of Ataturk’s secular republic is not lost on Istanbul residents.
Photos and more...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/22/worl ... 3053090324
As Islamism Fades, Iran Goes Nationalist
The republic is cautiously downplaying Islamism and emphasizing nationalism and foreign threats to win over disgruntled citizens.
Forty years after the 1979 revolution, Islamism is exhausting itself as a legitimizing force for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Studies sponsored by the Iranian government show that resentment toward the state’s religious symbols is at an all-time high.
According to the research arm of the Iranian parliament, around 70 percent of Iranian women do not strictly follow the official diktats for wearing a veil. Anticlerical sentiments have turned violent. Regardless of their ties to the government, clerics are routinely attacked and stabbed in the streets by angry anti-regime individuals.
Iran is responding by cautiously downplaying Islamism and emphasizing nationalism and foreign threats to win over disgruntled citizens. Iran’s leaders acknowledged the societal shift away from Islamism by making unprecedented references to nationalism and showing their determination to incorporate patriotic sentiments into the state ideology during the 40th anniversary celebrations of the revolution in February.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/opin ... dline&te=1
The republic is cautiously downplaying Islamism and emphasizing nationalism and foreign threats to win over disgruntled citizens.
Forty years after the 1979 revolution, Islamism is exhausting itself as a legitimizing force for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Studies sponsored by the Iranian government show that resentment toward the state’s religious symbols is at an all-time high.
According to the research arm of the Iranian parliament, around 70 percent of Iranian women do not strictly follow the official diktats for wearing a veil. Anticlerical sentiments have turned violent. Regardless of their ties to the government, clerics are routinely attacked and stabbed in the streets by angry anti-regime individuals.
Iran is responding by cautiously downplaying Islamism and emphasizing nationalism and foreign threats to win over disgruntled citizens. Iran’s leaders acknowledged the societal shift away from Islamism by making unprecedented references to nationalism and showing their determination to incorporate patriotic sentiments into the state ideology during the 40th anniversary celebrations of the revolution in February.
More...
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/03/opin ... dline&te=1
40 Years On: Reflections on the Iranian Revolution
by Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations
Free
Register at:
https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/40-years ... 0201730998
Description
Image Caption: 8 of March protest against compulsory hijab by women in 1979.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is widely seen as one of the most significant events of the 20th century, due to its dramatic consequences not only for the political, social and cultural landscape of Iran and the Middle East but also at a global scale. Marking the 40th anniversary of this historical event, this panel discussion brings together renowned scholars of Iran to revisit the debate on the causes and the impact of the revolution for Iran and beyond. In particular, it aims to address three main questions: What were the national and international conditions underpinning the revolutionary dynamics in Iran in the global context of the 1970s? How should the Iranian revolution be analysed in an historical-comparative perspective? And, what is the legacy, or rather, the multiple legacies, of the revolution for the political struggles in Iran and the Middle East today? By focusing on these questions, the panel seeks to reconsider some of the most salient issues stemming from the Iranian Revolution, such as Islamisation and the consequences for women and the national question in Iran, forty years on.
by Aga Khan University Institute for the Study of Muslim Civilisations
Free
Register at:
https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/40-years ... 0201730998
Description
Image Caption: 8 of March protest against compulsory hijab by women in 1979.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is widely seen as one of the most significant events of the 20th century, due to its dramatic consequences not only for the political, social and cultural landscape of Iran and the Middle East but also at a global scale. Marking the 40th anniversary of this historical event, this panel discussion brings together renowned scholars of Iran to revisit the debate on the causes and the impact of the revolution for Iran and beyond. In particular, it aims to address three main questions: What were the national and international conditions underpinning the revolutionary dynamics in Iran in the global context of the 1970s? How should the Iranian revolution be analysed in an historical-comparative perspective? And, what is the legacy, or rather, the multiple legacies, of the revolution for the political struggles in Iran and the Middle East today? By focusing on these questions, the panel seeks to reconsider some of the most salient issues stemming from the Iranian Revolution, such as Islamisation and the consequences for women and the national question in Iran, forty years on.
Arabs are losing faith in religious parties and leaders
Religious zeal is also falling in the region, particularly among the young
“NO TO RELIGION or sect,” cry the protesters in Iraq. “No to Islam, no to Christianity, revolt for the nation,” echo those in Lebanon. Across the Arab world people are turning against religious political parties and the clerics who helped bring them to power. Many appear to be giving up on Islam, too.
These trends are reflected in new data from Arab Barometer, a pollster that surveys Arab countries. Across the region the share of people expressing much trust in political parties, most of which have a religious tint, has fallen by well over a third since 2011, to 15%. (The share of Iraqis who say they do not trust parties at all rose from 51% to 78%.) The decline in trust for Islamist parties is similarly dramatic, falling from 35% in 2013, when the question was first widely asked, to 20% in 2018.
The doubts extend to religious leaders. In 2013 around 51% of respondents said they trusted their religious leaders to a “great” or “medium” extent. When a comparable question was asked last year the number was down to 40%. The share of Arabs who think religious leaders should have influence over government decision-making is also steadily declining. “State religious actors are often perceived as co-opted by the regime, making citizens unlikely to trust them,” says Michael Robbins of Arab Barometer.
The share of Arabs describing themselves as “not religious” is up to 13%, from 8% in 2013. That includes nearly half of young Tunisians, a third of young Libyans, a quarter of young Algerians and a fifth of young Egyptians. But the numbers are fuzzy. Nearly half of Iraqis described themselves as “religious”, up from 39% in 2013. Yet the share who say they attend Friday prayers has fallen by nearly half, to 33%. Perhaps faith is increasingly personal, says Mr Robbins.
Chart at:
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detai ... nd-leaders
Religious zeal is also falling in the region, particularly among the young
“NO TO RELIGION or sect,” cry the protesters in Iraq. “No to Islam, no to Christianity, revolt for the nation,” echo those in Lebanon. Across the Arab world people are turning against religious political parties and the clerics who helped bring them to power. Many appear to be giving up on Islam, too.
These trends are reflected in new data from Arab Barometer, a pollster that surveys Arab countries. Across the region the share of people expressing much trust in political parties, most of which have a religious tint, has fallen by well over a third since 2011, to 15%. (The share of Iraqis who say they do not trust parties at all rose from 51% to 78%.) The decline in trust for Islamist parties is similarly dramatic, falling from 35% in 2013, when the question was first widely asked, to 20% in 2018.
The doubts extend to religious leaders. In 2013 around 51% of respondents said they trusted their religious leaders to a “great” or “medium” extent. When a comparable question was asked last year the number was down to 40%. The share of Arabs who think religious leaders should have influence over government decision-making is also steadily declining. “State religious actors are often perceived as co-opted by the regime, making citizens unlikely to trust them,” says Michael Robbins of Arab Barometer.
The share of Arabs describing themselves as “not religious” is up to 13%, from 8% in 2013. That includes nearly half of young Tunisians, a third of young Libyans, a quarter of young Algerians and a fifth of young Egyptians. But the numbers are fuzzy. Nearly half of Iraqis described themselves as “religious”, up from 39% in 2013. Yet the share who say they attend Friday prayers has fallen by nearly half, to 33%. Perhaps faith is increasingly personal, says Mr Robbins.
Chart at:
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detai ... nd-leaders